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In the wake of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, the world has woken up to the importance of
biosecurity and the need to manage international borders. Yet strong sectorial identities
exist within biosecurity that are associated with specific international standards, individual
economic interests, specific research communities, and unique stakeholder involvement.
Despite considerable research addressing human, animal, plant, and environmental health,
the science connections between these sectors remain quite limited. One Biosecurity aims
to address these limitations at global, national, and local scales. It is an interdisciplinary
approach to biosecurity policy and research that builds on the interconnections between
human, animal, plant, and environmental health to effectively prevent and mitigate the
impacts of invasive alien species. It provides an integrated perspective to address the
many biosecurity risks that transcend the traditional boundaries of health, agriculture, and
the environment. Individual invasive alien plant and animal species often have multiple
impacts across sectors: as hosts of zoonotic parasites, vectors of pathogens, pests of
agriculture or forestry, as well as threats to biodiversity and ecosystem function. It is time
these risks were addressed in a systematic way. One Biosecurity is essential to address
several major sociological and environmental challenges to biosecurity: climate change,
increasing urbanisation, agricultural intensification, human global mobility, loss of technical
capability as well as public resistance to pesticides and vaccines. One Biosecurity will
require the bringing together of taxonomists, population biologists, modellers, economists,
chemists, engineers, and social scientists to engage in a new agenda that is shaped by
politics, legislation, and public perceptions.
One Biosecurity: time to progress invasion science
beyond One Health
In the wake of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, much of the world has become aware of the importance of
biosecurity in protecting global health (Figure 1) and in particular the need for more effective man-
agement of the risks of introducing unwanted organisms at international borders [1,2]. This has led
several countries to review their national biosecurity systems in order to gain from the lessons arising
from the pandemic [3–5]. Yet the lessons for implementing more robust biosecurity strategies are
much broader than most policymakers currently appreciate, going far beyond the actions undertaken
in response to SARS-CoV-2. Although biosecurity is sometimes viewed as a synonym of biodefense or
biosafety [6], it more commonly refers to the research, procedures, and policies that cover the exclu-
sion, eradication, or effective management of the risks posed by the introduction of alien plant pests,
animal pests and diseases, animal diseases capable of transmission to humans (zoonoses), the release
of genetically modified organisms and their products, and the management of invasive alien species
and genotypes [7,8]. Although this definition is often adopted in multilateral policy guidance [9–11],
at an international level the issues encompassed by biosecurity have traditionally been dealt with by
different sectors each with its own regulatory framework. The World Health Organisation (WHO),
the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), and the World Organisation for Animal Health
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(OIE) provide international standards for human health, plant health, and animal health, respectively, while
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) sets non-binding standards for the management of alien species
that threaten biodiversity [8,12,13]. These divisions are often echoed at the national level, with most govern-
ments developing domestic regulation relating to human health, agriculture and the environment through sep-
arate departments, ministries, or agencies [14,15].
These sectorial divisions appear not to recognise the fundamental similarities in the processes underpinning
biological invasions whether they relate to plant, animal, or human health and this may, in part, reflect the lack
of cross-disciplinary thinking among the research community [16,17]. Recent assessments have pointed out
similar dramatic increases in the rate at which plants, animals and microorganisms have been transported
around the world over the last 100 years [18]. Although SARS-CoV-2 has prompted a re-appraisal of human
diseases as biological invasions [2], this underplays the fact that some of the earliest invasive alien species were
undoubtedly the parasites and pathogens of humans [19]. The causative agent of leprosy (Mycobacterium
leprae) appears to have originated in Eastern Africa or the Near East over 2000 years ago and subsequently
spread with successive human migrations to Europe and Asia, then with European colonists who introduced
leprosy into West Africa and the Americas in the 18th century and the Pacific in the 19th century [20]. Viral
diseases such as smallpox, measles, mumps, and polio have undergone a similar trajectory, moving across the
globe within a few centuries in the wake of international trade [21]. Furthermore, the global distribution of
many zoonotic livestock diseases that are infectious to humans, such as highly pathogenic avian influenza, Q
fever, and anthrax, have been facilitated by human trade in poultry, cattle, pigs, and horses [22]. Thus, the
global redistribution of pathogens, parasites, plants, and animals should all be viewed as biological invasions
Figure 1. Temporal trend in the interest over time in biosecurity since January 2018 as captured by a sample of web searches submitted to
Google® and captured by Google Trends data for Australia, India, the U.K. and the United States.
Data are provided for actual search intensity each week (grey lines) and a 3 month rolling average (black lines). In each case, a clear increase in
global interest in biosecurity coincided with the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic in early 2020. Data represent the results of a search for the term
‘biosecurity’ on 21/08/20 and have been normalised to scale between 0 and 100.
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published by Portland Press Limited on behalf of the Biochemical Society and the Royal Society of Biology and distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License 4.0 (CC BY).
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[19] and since they share many fundamental aspects of their spatial and temporal dynamics [16,23,24] a more
integrated approach to biosecurity is warranted.
To be effective, biosecurity policies must take advantage of a more coherent, universal approach that seeks syn-
ergies between the health, agriculture, and environment sectors at national and international levels and should
aim to shift the traditional focus on regulating individual organisms and sectors to ensuring confidence in the
overall risk management framework [25]. Progress towards a more holistic approach to biosecurity has been
recognised by several recent initiatives. The One Health movement was initiated in 2007 with the aim of bringing
veterinary and human health closer together since the divide between veterinarians and doctors was seen as an
obstacle to addressing the many new or re-emerging human diseases that come from animals [26]. Although One
Health encompasses environmental health, the definition is fairly narrow in that the environment is viewed pri-
marily in terms of how it can influence the rate of disease emergence and transmission to humans such as via
tropical deforestation and/or climate change [27]. In 2014, the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) was
launched, committing over 20 governments to strengthen the capacities of national and local organisations to
prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease threats [28]. Although the GHSA aims to operationalise the
concept of One Health, it has a strong focus on improved vaccination programmes and reducing antimicrobial
resistance with less of an emphasis of the environment and socioeconomic drivers of human health [29]. More
recently, the Planetary Health Alliance (PHA) has sought to determine the human health consequences of
anthropogenic disruptions of Earth’s natural systems [30,31]. The PHA includes a much broader view of environ-
mental health that includes the need to ensure food security and secure access to safe drinking water, yet this
huge breadth of coverage and the complexity of the systems encompassed in environmental health could certainly
limit the implementation of the PHA [32]. Nevertheless, the One Health, GHSA, or PHA initiatives do not expli-
citly address the core issues of biosecurity, specifically the global proliferation of alien pests, weeds, and pathogens
that are inextricably intertwined and are significant threats to human wellbeing as well as public and environmen-
tal health. Here, the concept of One Biosecurity is proposed and elaborated for the first time in the scientific lit-
erature in order to present the strong synergies among plant, animal, human, and environmental health and the
urgent need for a more integrated treatment of biosecurity threats. One Biosecurity is an interdisciplinary
approach to biosecurity policy and research that builds on the interconnections between human, animal, plant,
and environmental health to prevent and mitigate the impacts of invasive alien species more effectively. However,
biosecurity is an incredibly broad topic that encompasses threats to food security from plant pests, loss of endan-
gered species due to alien predators, the spread of transgenes from genetically modified crops as well as the risks
of biological contaminants in food [7]. Thus in order to focus on the key principles, and given the considerable
global concern regarding emerging diseases and future pandemics [33,34], this review illustrates the value of the
One Biosecurity approach with particular reference to human health.
One Biosecurity captures the synergies in human, animal,
plant, and environmental health
Currently, strong sectorial identities exist within biosecurity that are associated with specific international stan-
dards, individual economic sectors such as health, agriculture and the environment, specific research communi-
ties and unique stakeholder involvement. For example, human biosecurity addresses zoonotic and emerging
disease diagnosis and investigation; animal biosecurity deals with disease prevention and control in livestock
production holdings, aquaculture farms, and feed storage facilities; plant biosecurity aims to safeguard plant
industries and crop production; whereas environmental biosecurity is concerned with the protection of the
environment and social amenity from the negative effects associated with invasive alien species [8]. Such divi-
sions work well when addressing the problems of biological invasions that are exclusive to a sector such as spe-
cialist pathogens, parasites, or pests that affect only a single host species. However, the links between human,
animal, plant, and environmental biosecurity have been little explored but are can often be substantial [7].
One Biosecurity provides a unified framework to address the many biosecurity risks that transcend the
traditional boundaries of animal health, plant health, human health, and the environment (Figure 2). There are
many examples where an alien species has impacts across multiple sectors including the environment and human
health. The raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides) originates in the Far East but is now a widespread invasive
canid species in Northern, Eastern, and Central Europe, where it not only competes successfully with native
predatory mammals but is also a vector of wildlife, livestock, and human diseases [35]. Similarly, the wild boar
(Sus scrofa) has been introduced to the Americas and Oceania where it destroys crops, is associated with declines
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published by Portland Press Limited on behalf of the Biochemical Society and the Royal Society of Biology and distributed under the Creative Commons
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in threatened and endangered species, and contributes to the transmission of a wide variety of parasites, viruses,
and bacteria that can infect humans and domestic livestock [36]. Cross-sectorial impacts are not limited to verte-
brates, invertebrates can also have impacts across human and livestock health. The giant African snail (Achatina
fulica) has been introduced widely throughout the tropics where its feeding leads to considerable crop losses
which are exacerbated by its role as a vector of plant pathogens (Phytophthora spp.), it outcompetes native gastro-
pods and is also an intermediate host playing a role in the transmission of Angiostrongulus spp. the causative
agents of eosinophilic meningoencephalitis in livestock and humans [37]. Invasive alien vectors of disease can
also have wider impacts. The Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus) is able to transmit at least 22 arboviruses to
wild and domesticated animals as well as humans and thus can impact the population viability of wildlife as well
as facilitate the spread of zoonotic diseases, such as Rift Valley virus from livestock to people [38]. However,
while the role that invasive alien plants, invertebrates and vertebrates play in human health has become increas-
ingly recognised [39–41], with the exception of alien mosquitoes, current understanding of the role of alien
species in the transmission of zoonotic diseases between livestock and humans remains limited.
In forest ecosystems, invasive alien plants not only impact upon biodiversity and forestry activities but can
also directly impact human and livestock health by facilitating the transmission of pathogens and parasites. The
understory structure provided by invasive alien shrubs such as Japanese barberry (Berberis thunbergii) and
multiflora rose (Rosa multiflora) provide a buffered microclimate that limits desiccation-induced mortality of
the blacklegged tick (Ixodes scapularis) increasing their density as well as the prevalence of infection with the
spirochete Borrelia burgdorferi the causative agent of Lyme disease that affects both human and livestock health
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the One Biosecurity concept emphasising the links between human, animal,
plant, and environmental health arising through the impacts of invasive alien plants, animals, and pathogens.
The dashed rectangle represents the sectors that are the focus of One Health and highlights the more comprehensive aspect
of One Biosecurity.
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published by Portland Press Limited on behalf of the Biochemical Society and the Royal Society of Biology and distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License 4.0 (CC BY).
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[42,43]. High rates of pathogen transmission will occur where the main reservoir hosts also preferentially
associate with the increased cover provided by invasive alien shrubs. Not all cross- sectoral impacts need be
through the spread of disease. Due to its painful sting, the red imported fire ant (Solenopsis invicta) causes
significant impacts on human and livestock health, but it also directly destroys crops at the seedling stage and
dramatically reduces the diversity of native invertebrates through predation [44]. A high alien weed density in
small grain cereal crops can reduce yields but also increase the prevalence of the alien fungal disease fusarium
head blight that leads to shrunken, low quality grains as well as results in the contamination of grains with
mycotoxins that are hazardous to animal and human health [45]. Common ragweed (Ambrosia artemisiifolia)
reduces crop yield, outcompetes native vegetation and produces large quantities of allergenic pollen that is a
significant cause of asthma and rhinitis in humans [46].
The foregoing examples highlight that a key aim of One Biosecurity is to drive a more holistic research
agenda that examines the impacts of invasive alien species across the health, agriculture, and the environment
sectors. Understandably, not all species will necessarily have impacts across all these sectors, but many will
undoubtedly impact at least two. However, despite considerable research addressing human, animal, plant, and
environmental health, the science connections between these sectors remain quite limited and much less than
would be expected given the volume of outputs for each individual sector (Figure 3). The strongest connections
are between the sectors traditionally associated with One Health, but even here less than 1% of published
research in the fields of human and animal health address connections between these sectors.
One Biosecurity addresses future challenges for health,
agriculture, and the environment
The world is facing major sociological, political, and environmental predicaments that require robust strategies
and responses. To illustrate why a One Biosecurity approach is needed, five major challenges are examined in
order to highlight the need for coordinated action: urbanisation, human mobility, capability deficits, agricul-
tural intensification, and management constraints.
Urban areas with high human population density appear to have been hardest hit by the SARS- CoV-2 pan-
demic [47]. It is expected that the urbanisation of rural regions and the increasing growth of megacities is likely
to lead to a heightened risk of pest and disease incursions as well as the emergence of new zoonoses due to the
increasing interaction of urban communities with invasive alien species. Human dominated ecosystems, such as
urban regions, host a greater diversity of zoonotic host species [48]. As a consequence, urban development is one
of the main drivers of disease spillover from wildlife to humans and domestic animals, but also from domestic
animals to wildlife [49]. Furthermore, alien species comprise an increasingly significant proportion of biodiversity
in urban ecosystems [50]. Many alien bird and mammal species in urban environments have zoonotic potential
[51] and this indicates a potential for high rates of transmission either directly to humans or via domesticated
animals. Yet for most vertebrates introduced around the world, their effectiveness as reservoir hosts of zoonotic
pathogens is unknown. This represents a significant gap in the management of future zoonotic risk.
The projected increases in the international movement of people and goods, particularly from areas that
present higher biosecurity risks, will further complicate the ability to identify biosecurity risks at international
borders. In 2013, there were over one billion tourists moving between different countries around the world
and this has been forecast to reach 1.8 billion by 2030 with tourists now increasingly visiting regions away from
traditional holiday destinations [52,53]. This will result in the potential for tourists to not only inadvertently
introduce alien species into new environments but also become exposed to zoonotic agents. Airline baggage is
an important route through which alien insect pests can enter new regions [54], while soil on footwear and
sports equipment can introduce plant pathogens [52]. In Europe, the Asian tiger mosquito has been responsible
for outbreaks of dengue in France, chikungunya virus in Italy and West Nile Virus in Greece as a result of a
single infected human host returning from overseas and subsequently facilitating disease transmission [55]. The
importance of international travel in the spread of invasive alien species has been underscored in the effective-
ness of strict travel and border control measures on the global spread of SARS-CoV-2 [56]. However, such
drastic action is not sustainable in the long-term thus integrated solutions to manage all sources of risk arising
from international travellers must be developed in the future.
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has highlighted the lack of preparedness of many countries to deal with a health
crisis on such a large scale and the shortage of appropriately trained public health officials [57]. A critical issue
facing all areas of biosecurity is the skill shortages in key areas such as taxonomy, microbiology, and
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entomology that place significant limitations on the ability to develop biosecurity systems and respond to pest
and disease incursions. The development of formal, internationally recognised, qualifications that deliver high
standards of professional excellence in biosecurity is viewed as an essential step to respond to the increasing
exposure of society and the environment to biological threats [58]. Although in many areas professional
qualifications already exist [59,60], they are rarely sufficiently comprehensive to meet contemporary biosecurity
challenges. Academic institutions and employers must recognise that biosecurity is a multidisciplinary field
that draws on a wide range of subjects including epidemiology, pathobiology, economics, social behaviour, and
invasion science. The SARS-CoV- 2 pandemic has revealed that biosecurity professionals need not only to
have an understanding of risk management in containment facilities, but also virus pathogenesis, the role of
non-human hosts in the emergence of zoonotic diseases, the implications of global travel and trade on disease
spread as well as the social challenges of disease mitigation and control. Rather than relying on a set of
narrowly focused credentials, implementing a much broader multidisciplinary curriculum as a foundation for
biosecurity professionals will be essential to strengthen the world’s ability to prevent, detect, and respond to
invasive alien species threats worldwide.
Figure 3. Network diagram describing the links captured by the scientific literature addressing the topics of human
health (H), animal health (A), plant health (P), and environmental health (E).
The size of the circles is proportional to the number of papers published on that topic while the size of the arrows is
proportional to the number of papers that address the two adjoining topics. Data are from a literature search using Web of
Science over the period 1980–2019 undertaken on 21/08/20 using the individual search terms ‘human health’, ‘animal health’,
‘plant health,’ and ‘environmental health’ either on their own or in pairs.
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published by Portland Press Limited on behalf of the Biochemical Society and the Royal Society of Biology and distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License 4.0 (CC BY).
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The increasing intensification of agriculture to supply an ever greater demand from the world’s population
for more food [61] will affect the ability to contain and limit the spread of a pest or disease following an incur-
sion or outbreak. The role that the intensification of livestock production could play in future animal and
human disease pandemics is well recognised by national and international bodies [62]. While agricultural
intensification is known to be a potential trigger for pest outbreaks in agricultural crops [63,64], the strategies
to mitigate such risks are not well developed. There is, therefore, considerable opportunity for cross-fertilization
in best practice across plant and animal health. More importantly, it is generally underappreciated how disease
risks to human health can also impact global food security. Epizootic pandemics such as avian flu or African
swine fever directly reduced animal-sourced food output, while restrictions in the international movement of
agricultural labourers in response to SARS-CoV-2 have disrupted supply chains and increased the volatility of
commodity prices on the international market [65]. The strong interrelationships between human, animal,
plant, and environmental health associated with food production require joined up thinking across the health,
agriculture, and environment sectors when building greater global food security.
Despite the high profile of health risks arising from the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic there remains substantial con-
cerns regarding the likely levels of compliance (even among medical workers) should an effective vaccine become
available [66]. Similarly, the effective management of pest animals, weeds, and agricultural pathogens is becoming
increasingly difficult. At least two global trends will challenge existing approaches to the management of invasive
alien species, including human and livestock diseases. The first trend is the increasing resistance of invasive alien
plants, invertebrates, vertebrates, and pathogens to methods of chemical control, whether in the form of pesti-
cides, fungicides, herbicides, or antimicrobials [67–71]. Strategies to combat resistance to chemical control strat-
egies are vital to ensure the sustainability of current invasive alien species management, and this requires
research to find alternative mode-of-action synthetic chemical pesticides and other nonchemical approaches.
However, the rate at which new pesticides and antimicrobials are being registered is slower than the rate at which
active ingredients are being removed from the market and may limit the ability to control pests, weeds, and
pathogens [72,73]. The second trend is the social resistance to the tools used to combat pests, weeds, and patho-
gens. The management of vertebrate pests depends on the use of traps, pesticides, repellents, and other methods,
each of which can cause varying levels of pain and other negative experiences to animals. Increasingly the
humaneness of control techniques is viewed as more important than its effectiveness resulting in humane but
less efficient tools being available for pest control [74]. The public are increasingly resistant to pesticides in the
environment and in their food, putting increasing pressure on pest control to apply more environmentally
acceptable alternatives and/or reduce rates of application [75]. At the same time, there remains a growing social
movement of public health vaccine opposition [76,77]. In the United States, an increasing number of antivaccine
activities are being established in major metropolitan areas, rendering select cities vulnerable for vaccination-
preventable diseases [77]. This is a particularly alarming development since urban areas are likely to be hotspots
for the emergence of new zoonotic diseases. The consequences of these two global trends is that post-border bio-
security management will become increasingly complex, challenging scientists to develop new tools to replace
currently unacceptable approaches and compelling society to appreciate the cost and benefits of pest and disease
control. Given the parallels in these trends facing both human and animal health as well as plant and environ-
mental health, a unified approach under the banner of One Biosecurity would certainly bring benefits.
These five challenges illustrate the need for the greater integration promoted by the One Biosecurity concept.
Many other similar challenges exist that require a unified approach, not least the impact of climate change
which will not only have a direct effect on the biology of pathogens, plants, invertebrate, and vertebrates and
their constituent ecosystems [49,78,79] but also will frame the human responses that might exacerbate these
direct effects. Furthermore, climate change will interact with several of the challenges listed above such as
urbanisation, human mobility, and agricultural intensification. These trends emphasise the urgency of adopting
a One Biosecurity perspective.
One Biosecurity: a better way forward
The earliest conceptualisation of One Biosecurity stems from a review of Australia’s quarantine and biosecurity
arrangements undertaken in 2008 that sought to encourage a stronger partnership between the federal and
state governments underpinned by a legal framework to support national responses to alien pests and diseases
relevant to agriculture [15]. However, as has been shown in the previous sections, One Biosecurity must build
on the interconnections among the health, agriculture, and environment sectors, have relevance at global,
national and local scales and be interdisciplinary by embracing the natural and social sciences. By defining
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published by Portland Press Limited on behalf of the Biochemical Society and the Royal Society of Biology and distributed under the Creative Commons
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One Biosecurity in these broader and more enlightened terms the potential for transformative change in the
management of invasive alien species is much more likely. A One Biosecurity perspective will require the
bringing together of taxonomists, population biologists, modellers, economists, chemists, engineers, and social
scientists to engage in an agenda that is shaped by politics, legislation, and public perceptions. However, One
Biosecurity could easily suffer the same criticisms faced by One Health that it is no more than a buzzword and
that in most cases the disciplinary divisions remain [80]. How might this be avoided?
The first step is to ensure that the development of One Biosecurity sits front and centre of international and
national policies. Under the SPS Agreement, World Trade Organization Members have the right to adopt sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, and plant life or health [81].
These measures must be science-based, not more trade restrictive than required and not arbitrarily or unjustifi-
ably discriminatory against trading partners. This clearly argues for a holistic approach that embraces the
health, agriculture, and environment sectors as captured by One Biosecurity. While this should mean that
assessments need to capture the risks to human, animal, and plant life, at present the cross-sectorial nature of
biological invasions is not captured effectively in the tools used for assessing biosecurity risks. For example,
national and international animal health panels only examine the risks of introducing species that might
directly or indirectly harm animal health [82], while risk assessments of plant pests (weeds, insects, and patho-
gens) focus on impacts on crop yields and ecosystem services [83] and those for invasive alien species examine
impacts on biodiversity [84]. Building interdisciplinary risk assessment tools should be a priority but is not
without its challenges. It is likely that the environmental and social costs of biological invasions will be dwarfed
by those of the human health and agriculture sectors, even where costs of control and eradication are similar
and this will make the weighing up of risks more complex. For example, in New Zealand, estimates of the total
expected costs of all established alien plants on the environment over 10 years amounted to only one-third of
the likely annual cost of managing a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak [7]. However, the development of these
tools will also be an effective means of bringing different disciplines together, allowing the comparison of
different risk assessment protocols to derive an optimum hybrid approach that might be a radical departure
from current techniques and catalyse interdisciplinary research agendas to fill the many knowledge gaps.
Developing a common risk assessment approach while essential, will not in itself drive the adoption of One
Biosecurity. This first requires common understanding among scientists and policymakers of the shared threats
invasive alien species pose to animal, plant, human, and environmental health. An initial mechanism may be
to raise awareness of the benefits of One Biosecurity through the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) which has recently launched a specific assessment on the impacts
of invasive alien species, including threats to human health and quality of life [85]. With sufficient momentum,
a specific International Convention addressing One Biosecurity could provide the essential governance over-
sight across existing multilateral agreements and conventions to ensure a more co-ordinated and synergistic
approach to global biosecurity. However, such an option would need to overcome increasing resistance to
multilateral initiatives [86] which could be possible if the wider economic benefits as well as cost-effectiveness
of an International Biosecurity Convention are made self-evident. However, the concept of One Health has
gained momentum even in the absence of a dedicated International Convention [87]. In the absence of a multi-
lateral support, nation states such as New Zealand and Australia that already have a strong biosecurity regula-
tions could lead the way in developing national One Biosecurity frameworks which, if successful, could catalyse
other nations to follow suit. Time will tell how feasible these options might be but hopefully it will not take
another global pandemic for the logic of One Biosecurity to be realised.
Summary
• Biosecurity is increasingly important in an ever more connected world that is exposed to
multiple threats that impact human health, agriculture, and the environment sectors, yet policy
is strongly sector specific.
• One Biosecurity bridges these sectors to allow greater foresight in the management of
invasive alien plants, animals and pathogens that impact human health, animal health, plant
health, and the environment.
© 2020 The Author(s). This is an open access article published by Portland Press Limited on behalf of the Biochemical Society and the Royal Society of Biology and distributed under the Creative Commons
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• Many invasive species impact multiple sectors but to date their overall threat to society and
the economy are insufficiently well captured by current risk assessment tools resulting in
unforeseen outcomes.
• The major future challenges to biosecurity such as urbanisation, climate change, agricultural
intensification, and increased human mobility all require the more holistic understanding pro-
vided by One Biosecurity to achieve a greater cross-fertilization of ideas and an improvement
in approaches to deal with threats that impact multiple sectors.
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